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Assigning a Small Agreeable Set of
Indivisible Items to Multiple Players∗
Warut Suksompong
Stanford University
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well
as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small
subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen
subset is agreeable to all players, i.e., every player weakly prefers the chosen
subset to any subset of its complement. For an arbitrary number of players,
we derive tight upper bounds on the size for which a subset of that size
that is agreeable to all players always exists when preferences are monotonic.
We then present polynomial-time algorithms that find an agreeable subset
of approximately half of the items when there are two or three players and
preferences are responsive. Our results translate to a 2-approximation on the
individual welfare of every player when preferences are subadditive.
1 Introduction
Consider the following assignment problem with aspects of fair division as well as social
choice: A group of agents are going together on a road trip, and they have to collectively
agree upon a subset of items to bring with them in a bag that can hold a limited number
of items. Naturally, the agents have different interests on different items, but they always
like a set at least as much as any subset of it. The set of items included in the bag should
be selected in such a way that any agent weakly prefers it to the set of items left at home.
How large does the bag need to be in order to guarantee that there always exists such
a subset—an agreeable subset—that fits within it? And how can we efficiently compute
an agreeable subset?
Our notion of agreeability is closely related to envy-freeness, a well-studied notion in
fair division [9, 10, 14, 15, 19], and variants of agreeability have been considered in the
literature [5, 8, 12]. An envy-free allocation is one in which every player weakly prefers
her bundle to that of any other player. Both agreeability and envy-freeness involve
players being happy if their allocation is at least as good as some other allocation(s).
In previous work on fair division, each allocation is typically assigned to a single player,
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, July 2016.
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and the player compares the allocation that she receives with the allocations that other
players receive. A novelty in our setting is the introduction of a social choice aspect to
the allocation problem, i.e., we assign the same subset of items to multiple players with
possibly wildly differing preferences. This corresponds to the social choice framework
of aggregating individual preferences to reach a collective decision for the whole group
[3, 13].1 However, the envy-freeness condition is one-directional in our setting—there
is no envy associated to the unassigned set of items. Our setting can also be seen as a
multiagent knapsack problem in which every item has the same size and the agreeability
condition is imposed, and it bears a resemblance to the consensus halving and necklace
bisection problems [1, 25].
For an arbitrary number of players, we derive tight upper bounds on the size for
which a subset of that size that is agreeable to all players always exists when preferences
are monotonic. Remarkably, even if the subset of items needs to be allocated to several
players, the number of extra items that we might need to choose in order to accommodate
all of them is quite small, i.e., half an item per additional player. We then present
polynomial-time algorithms that compute an agreeable subset of approximately half of
the items when there are two or three players and preferences are responsive. Our results
translate to a 2-approximation on the individual welfare of every player when preferences
are subadditive.
The assumptions that we make on the players’ preferences, monotonicity and respon-
siveness, are practical in a broad range of settings. Monotonicity says that a player
cannot be worse off whenever an item is added to her set, while the stronger notion of
responsiveness says that a player cannot be worse off whenever an item is added to her set
or replaced by another item that she weakly prefers to the original item. These assump-
tions are common in the literature2 and have been made, for example, in [11, 12, 4, 21],
with the latter two only assuming monotonicity. For our existence results we will only
assume monotonicity, and we will assume responsiveness for our algorithms.
Even though the need to assign as many as half of the items even for two or three play-
ers might not seem that impressive at first glance, the reader should bear in mind that
the conditions that we impose on the valuation functions are not many. For instance,
monotonicity and responsiveness are generalizations of additivity, a very common as-
sumption on preferences (e.g., [16]). Since we consider very general valuation functions,
it is natural that the size of the selected set is relatively large. Indeed, in the simple
case where we want to assign items to a single player whose preference only depends on
the number of items and who prefers more items than less, we already need to assign to
her at least half of the items. In this light, our result that we only need to assign half
an item extra in the worst case for each additional player is quite intriguing.
An important issue when we discuss algorithms for computing desirable allocations
is how we represent the players’ preferences. Since preferences on subsets, unlike pref-
erences on single items, might not have a succinct representation, this would already
1In fact, fair division can also be viewed as a social choice problem in the sense that a collective decision,
concerning the allocation of the resources to the different players, has to be reached.
2For a comprehensive treatment of properties concerning the ranking of sets of objects, we refer to [6].
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disallow algorithms that run in polynomial time in the number of players and the num-
ber of items if the algorithm were required to read the whole preference input. To
circumvent this problem, we instead assume the existence of a preference oracle. In par-
ticular, we allow the algorithm to make a polynomial number of queries to the preference
oracle. In each query, the algorithm can specify a player and two subsets of items to
the preference oracle, and the oracle reveals the preference of that player between the
two subsets. The use of the oracle model is common in the computer science literature
[2, 18, 24].
2 Definitions and notation
In this section, we introduce the setting and give definitions and notation that we will
use throughout this paper.
We consider n players, numbered 1, 2, . . . , n, who must collectively choose a subset of
the set S = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} of m indivisible items. Denote by S the set of all subsets
of S. Each player i is endowed with a preference relation i, a reflexive, complete, and
transitive ordering over S. Let ≻i denote the strict part and ∼i the indifference part of
the relation i. For items x and y, we will sometimes abuse notation and write x  y
to mean {x}  {y}.
Next, we define two properties of preferences that we will consider in the paper. Both
properties are standard in the literature. The first property, monotonicity, says roughly
that “more is better”, i.e., a player cannot be worse off whenever an item is added to
her set.
Definition 1. A preference  on S is monotonic if T ∪ {x}  T for all T ⊆ S.
Note that if x ∈ T , then T ∪ {x}  T always holds, so we only need to check when
x ∈ S\T .
We will assume throughout most of the paper that preferences are monotonic. Mono-
tonicity is a natural assumption in a broad range of situations. In particular, it implies
free disposal of items, i.e., every item is considered to be of nonnegative value to each
player.
The next property, responsiveness, says that a player cannot be worse off whenever
an item is added to her set or replaced by another item that she weakly prefers to the
original item. While stronger than monotonicity, responsiveness is still a reasonable
assumption in many settings.
Definition 2. A preference  on S is responsive if it satisfies the following two condi-
tions:
•  is monotonic;
• T\{y} ∪ {x}  T for all T ⊆ S and x, y such that x  y, x 6∈ T and y ∈ T .
Given two sets T1 = {xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik}with i1 < i2 < · · · < ik and T2 = {xj1 , xj2 , . . . , xjk}
with j1 < j2 < · · · < jk, T1 is said to lexicographically dominate T2 if the following two
statements hold for some l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}:
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1. il′ = jl′ for all 1 ≤ l
′ < l;
2. il < jl.
For instance, one can check that the set {x1, x3, x5, x8} lexicographically dominates
the set {x1, x3, x6, x7}, while the set {x4, x5} does not lexicographically dominate the
set {x3, x10}.
We now consider two examples of preferences.
Example 1. Consider the preference 1 on S defined as follows. For distinct subsets
T1, T2 ⊆ S, we have T1 ≻1 T2 if one of the following two conditions holds:
• |T1| > |T2|;
• |T1| = |T2| and T1 lexicographically dominates T2.
For instance, when m = 3, the preference 1 is given by
{x1, x2, x3} ≻1 {x1, x2} ≻1 {x1, x3} ≻1 {x2, x3} ≻1 {x1} ≻1 {x2} ≻1 {x3} ≻1 ∅.
Example 2. Consider the preference 2 on S defined as follows. For distinct subsets
T1, T2 ⊆ S, we have T1 ≻2 T2 if one of the following three conditions holds:
• x1 ∈ T1 and x1 6∈ T2;
• x1 ∈ T1, T2 or x1 6∈ T1, T2, and |T1| > |T2|;
• x1 ∈ T1, T2 or x1 6∈ T1, T2, and |T1| = |T2| and T1 lexicographically dominates T2.
For instance, when m = 3, the preference 2 is given by
{x1, x2, x3} ≻2 {x1, x2} ≻2 {x1, x3} ≻2 {x1} ≻2 {x2, x3} ≻2 {x2} ≻2 {x3} ≻2 ∅.
One can check that the preferences in Examples 1 and 2 are both monotonic and
responsive. Moreover, they share the same preference on the single items in S, i.e.,
x1 ≻ x2 ≻ · · · ≻ xm.
Next, we define the notion of agreeability. We denote the complement of a set T by
−T := S\T .
Definition 3. Player i regards a subset T ⊆ S as agreeable if T i −T .
When preferences are monotonic, agreeability also implies that the player does not
prefer any subset of the complement to her current set. That is, we have T i U for any
U ⊆ −T .
We now define two properties of subsets of items based on the preference on single
items. In general, we will use  to denote the preference on S and sing to denote
the preference on the single items in S. The first property, possible agreeability, says
that a subset is “strictly agreeable” for some responsive preference consistent with the
preference on single items.
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Definition 4. Fix a preference sing on the single items in S. A subset T ⊆ S is
possibly agreeable with respect to sing if there exists a responsive preference  on S
consistent with sing such that T ≻ −T .
The next property, necessary agreeability, concerns the situation in which a subset is
agreeable for any responsive preference consistent with the preference on single items.
Definition 5. Fix a preference sing on the single items in S. A subset T ⊆ S is
necessarily agreeable with respect to sing if T  −T for any responsive preference 
on S consistent with sing.
We now make a connection to the model in which every player has a cardinal utility
for each subset of items. A utility function f is a function that maps any subset of items
to a nonnegative real number. We assume that utility functions are monotonic, i.e.,
f(T1) ≤ f(T2) for all subsets of items T1 ⊆ T2. A utility function f is said to be additive
if f(T1 ∪ T2) = f(T1) + f(T2) for all disjoint subsets of items T1 and T2, and is said to
be subadditive if f(T1 ∪ T2) ≤ f(T1) + f(T2) for all subsets of items T1 and T2. Any
nonnegative monotonic additive utility function is also subadditive. Subadditive utility
functions have been widely considered in the literature [17, 7].
When the preferences of the players are given by subadditive utility functions, a subset
that a player regards as agreeable also gives the player a utility of at least 1/2 of the
utility that the player obtains from the whole set S of items. Indeed, for any such subset
T we have f(S) = f(T∪−T ) ≤ f(T )+f(−T ) ≤ 2f(T ), which implies that f(T ) ≥ 1
2
f(S).
Hence our results concerning subsets that are agreeable to every player also translate
to a 2-approximation on the individual welfare of every player when preferences are
subadditive.
3 Possibly and necessarily agreeable subsets
In this section, we investigate possibly and necessarily agreeable subsets and provide
characterizations for such sets. The characterizations will later be useful in the analyses
of our algorithms for computing an agreeable subset when there are two or three players.
The following proposition shows a relationship between the two classes of subsets.
Proposition 1. Fix a preference sing on the single items in S. A subset T ⊆ S is
possibly agreeable with respect to sing if and only if −T is not necessarily agreeable with
respect to sing.
Proof. Suppose first that T is possibly agreeable with respect to sing. By definition,
there exists a responsive preference  on S consistent with sing such that T ≻ −T .
This means that −T  T does not hold for the responsive preference . Hence −T is
not necessarily agreeable with respect to sing.
The converse can be shown similarly.
We now characterize possibly and necessarily agreeable subsets.
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Proposition 2. Fix a preference sing on the single items in S with
x1 
sing x2 
sing · · · sing xm.
Let T ⊆ S, and define Ik = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
(a) If |Ik∩T | ≥
k
2
for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, then T is necessarily agreeable with respect
to sing. The converse also holds if the preference sing is strict.
(b) If T is possibly agreeable with respect to sing, then |Ik ∩ T | >
k
2
for some k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,m}. The converse also holds if the preference sing is strict.
Proof. (a) Suppose first that |Ik ∩ T | ≥
k
2
for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Since |Im ∩ T | ≥
m
2
,
we have that |T | ≥ | − T |. Let T ′ ⊆ T be the subset consisting of the | − T | elements of
T with the smallest indices.
Define a bijective function f : T ′ → −T as follows: Given the element xk ∈ T with
the smallest index for which f(xk) is not yet defined, we define f(xk) to be the element
in −T with the smallest index that has not occurred in the range of f so far. Since
|Ik ∩ T | ≥
k
2
for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the function f maps each element xk to another
element xl with l > k. Hence T is necessarily agreeable with respect to 
sing.
Now, suppose that the preference sing is strict, and that |Ik ∩ T | <
k
2
for some
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Since the (⌊k
2
⌋ + 1)-th element of −T has a smaller index than the
(⌊k
2
⌋ + 1)-th element of T (if the latter element exists at all), there exists a responsive
preference  on S consistent with sing such that −T ≻ T . Hence T is not necessarily
agreeable with respect to sing.
(b) Suppose first that T is possibly agreeable with respect to sing. By Proposition 1,
−T is not necessarily agreeable with respect to ′. Part (a) implies that |Ik ∩ −T | <
k
2
for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. It follows that |Ik ∩ T | >
k
2
for this value of k.
When the preferencesing is strict, the converse can be shown similarly to the converse
of part (a).
4 Two players
In this section, we assume that there are two players and consider the problem of choos-
ing a small subset that is agreeable to both players. We show that if preferences are
monotonic, we can choose a subset of approximately half of the items that is agreeable
to both players. Moreover, if we are given the preferences on the single items of the two
players, we can choose a subset of approximately half of the items that is necessarily
agreeable with respect to both preferences, and we present a polynomial-time algorithm
to do so.
For arbitrary preferences that are not monotonic, the task of choosing any subset that
is agreeable to two players might not be possible. Indeed, suppose that preferences are
strict, and that the preference of one player is exactly the reverse of that of the other
player. Then any subset is not agreeable for one of the players.
Nevertheless, when we impose the light assumption of monotonicity on the preferences,
the following proposition shows that we can choose a subset of approximately half of
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the items that is agreeable to both players. Even though the proposition will later be
generalized by Theorem 2, the proof of Theorem 2 relies crucially on a theorem best
known as Kneser’s conjecture, which we use as a black box. We believe that a direct
proof of Proposition 3 may well be useful both for understanding and for applying the
result.
Proposition 3. Assume that there are two players with monotonic preferences on S.
There exists a subset T ⊆ S such that |T | ≤
⌈
m+1
2
⌉
and T is agreeable to both players.
Moreover, there exist monotonic preferences for which the bound ⌈m+1
2
⌉ is tight.
Proof. Denote by 1 and 2 the preferences on S of the two players.
Assume first that m = 2k+1 is odd. Suppose for contradiction that no subset of size
at most k + 1 is agreeable to both players. Let T ⊆ S be such that |T | = k. We begin
by proving the following claim.
Claim: If T ≻1 −T , then
T ∪ {x}\{x′} ≻1 −T\{x} ∪ {x
′}
for any x ∈ −T and x′ ∈ T .
Proof of Claim: Suppose that T ≻1 −T , x ∈ −T , and x
′ ∈ T . It follows from
monotonicity of the preferences that T ∪ {x} ≻1 −T\{x}. Since no subset of size at
most k + 1 is agreeable to both players, we have −T\{x} ≻2 T ∪ {x}. By monotonicity
of the preferences again, we have −T\{x}∪{x′} ≻2 T ∪{x}\{x
′}. Hence T ∪{x}\{x′} ≻1
−T\{x} ∪ {x′}, and our claim is proved.
We now use our claim to obtain the desired contradiction. Assume without loss
of generality that {x1, x2, . . . , xk} ≻1 {xk+1, xk+2, . . . , x2k+1}. Applying our claim re-
peatedly to move elements between the two sets, we find that {xk+1, x2, . . . , xk} ≻1
{x1, xk+2, . . . , x2k+1}, {xk+1, xk+2, x3, . . . , xk} ≻1 {x1, x2, xk+3, . . . , x2k+1}, and so on,
until finally {xk+1, xk+2, . . . , x2k} ≻1 {x1, x2, . . . , xk, x2k+1}. By monotonicity of the
preferences, we have that {xk+1, xk+2, . . . , x2k+1} ≻1 {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, which contradicts
our assumption that {x1, x2, . . . , xk} ≻1 {xk+1, xk+2, . . . , x2k+1}.
Assume now that m = 2k is even. Let S′ be the set of all elements of S except x1. We
know from the case of m odd that there exists a subset T ⊆ S′ of size at most k such
that T 1 S
′\T and T 2 S
′\T . Since the players have monotonic preferences, we have
that T ∪ {x1} 1 S
′\T and T ∪ {x1} 2 S
′\T . This means that the set T ∪ {x1} of size
at most k + 1 is our desired subset.
Finally, we show that there exist preferences for which the bound ⌈m+1
2
⌉ is tight.
Consider the preferences 1 and 2 on S defined as follows. For distinct subsets T1, T2 ⊆
S, we have T1 ≻1 T2 if either |T1| > |T2|, or |T1| = |T2| and T1 lexicographically
dominates T2. Similarly, we have T1 ≻2 T2 if either |T1| > |T2|, or |T1| = |T2| and T2
lexicographically dominates T1. One can check that the two preferences are monotonic,
and that the bound ⌈m+1
2
⌉ is tight for these preferences.
While Proposition 3 shows the existence of a subset of approximately half of the
items that is agreeable to both players, it does not show how to obtain such a subset. If
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preferences are also responsive, it is possible to lift preferences over single items to partial
preferences over subsets. The next theorem shows that by considering only preferences
over single items, it is possible to find a subset of approximately half of the items that is
guaranteed to be agreeable to both players, no matter what the (responsive) preferences
are.
Theorem 1. Assume that there are two players with preferences sing
1
and sing
2
on the
single items in S. There exists a subset T ⊆ S such that |T | ≤
⌈
m+1
2
⌉
and T is necessarily
agreeable with respect to both sing
1
and sing
2
. Moreover, there exist preferences on the
single items in S for which the bound ⌈m+1
2
⌉ is tight. We also give a polynomial-time
algorithm that finds such a subset T .
Proof. Assume first that m = 2k + 1 is odd, and suppose without loss of generality
that x1 
sing
1
x2 
sing
1
· · · sing
1
x2k+1. One can check using Proposition 2 that the set
{x1, x3, x5, . . . , x2k+1} is necessarily agreeable with respect to 
sing
1
. We choose our set
T of k + 1 items as follows.
1. We choose x1.
2. Between each of the k pairs of items {x2, x3}, {x4, x5}, . . . , {x2k, x2k+1}, we choose
the item that is preferred according to sing
2
. If sing
2
is indifferent between any
pair of items, we choose arbitrarily.
Since our set T is at least as good as the set {x1, x3, x5, . . . , x2k+1} with respect to
sing
1
, and the latter set is necessarily agreeable with respect to sing
1
, T is also neces-
sarily agreeable with respect to sing
1
. Moreover, since we choose the item that sing
2
prefers from each of the sets {x2, x3}, {x4, x5}, . . . , {x2k, x2k+1}, T is also necessarily
agreeable with respect to sing
2
. Hence T is necessarily agreeable with respect to both
sing
1
and sing
2
.
Assume now that m = 2k is even. Let S′ be the set of all items of S except x1. We
apply the algorithm from the case of m odd to choose a set T ⊆ S′ of k items such
that T is necessarily agreeable with respect to both sing
1
and sing
2
, when the universe
considered is S′. It follows that T ∪ {x1} is a subset of k + 1 items that is necessarily
agreeable with respect to both sing
1
and sing
2
, when the universe considered is S.
Next, we show that there exist preferences for which the bound ⌈m+1
2
⌉ is tight. If
m = 2k + 1 is odd and the preferences in sing
1
are strict, then by Proposition 2, any
subset T ⊆ S that is necessarily agreeable with respect to sing
1
alone must already
contain at least k + 1 items.
Now suppose that m = 2k is even, and let sing
1
and sing
2
be given by x1 ≻
sing
1
x2 ≻
sing
1
· · · ≻sing
1
x2k and x2k ≻
sing
2
x2k−1 ≻
sing
2
· · · ≻sing
2
x1. By Proposition 2, any
subset T ⊆ S that is necessarily agreeable with respect to sing
1
alone must contain
at least k items, one of which is x1. If T contains exactly k items, then it contains
exactly k− 1 items among x2, x3, . . . , x2k. Proposition 2 implies that such a set T is not
necessarily agreeable with respect to sing
2
. Hence any subset T ⊆ S that is necessarily
agreeable with respect to both sing
1
and sing
2
must contain at least k + 1 items, as
desired.
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Since the algorithm in Theorem 1 only considers preferences on single items, it remains
efficient even when the number of items is relatively large.
We can generalize the notion of necessary agreeability by defining a subset T ⊆ S to
be necessarily worth at least 1/k with respect to sing for some fixed positive integer
k ≥ 2 if the complement −T can be partitioned into k − 1 sets T1, T2, . . . , Tk−1 so that
T  Ti for all i and any responsive preference  on S consistent with 
sing. Necessary
agreeability then corresponds to being necessarily worth at least 1/2. An algorithm
similar to that in Theorem 1 yields a subset T ⊆ S such that |T | ≤
⌈
m+k−1
k
⌉
and T is
necessarily worth at least 1/k with respect to both sing
1
and sing
2
. This bound is again
tight.
5 Three or more players
In this section, we consider the problem of choosing a small subset that is agreeable
to multiple players. We generalize Proposition 3 by showing that if preferences are
monotonic, we can choose a subset of size approximately half of the number of items
plus half of the number of players that is agreeable to all players. Moreover, if there are
three players and preferences are also responsive, we present a polynomial-time algorithm
for computing such a subset.
We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The graph with all k-element subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n} as vertices and with
edges connecting disjoint sets has chromatic number n−2k+2 if n ≥ 2k, and 1 otherwise.
Lemma 1 was conjectured by Kneser, and is therefore best known as Kneser’s con-
jecture [20]. It was first resolved by Lova´sz using topological methods, and was later
simplified several times, before Matousˇek gave a purely combinatorial proof [22, 23]. The
lemma will play a crucial role in our next theorem.
Proposition 3 shows that if there are two players, we can choose a subset of approx-
imately half of the items that is agreeable to both players. It is natural to ask what
happens when there are more than two players. Given that the preferences of the players
can differ wildly, it is perhaps surprising that the price we need to pay is only approxi-
mately half an item for each additional player, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2. Assume that there are n players with monotonic preferences on S. There
exists a subset T ⊆ S such that |T | ≤ min
(⌈
m+n−1
2
⌉
,m
)
and T is agreeable to all n play-
ers. Moreover, there exist monotonic preferences for which the bound min
(
⌈m+n−1
2
⌉,m
)
is tight.
Proof. Let k = ⌈m+n−1
2
⌉. If k ≥ m, the set S of all items has size m = min(k,m) and
is agreeable to all n players since preferences are monotonic. Assume from now on that
k < m, and consider the graph G with all (m − k)-element subsets of {x1, x2, . . . , xm}
as vertices and with edges connecting disjoint sets. If all n players weakly prefer S\T to
T for some (m− k)-element subset T ⊆ S, then S\T is our desired subset of size k.
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Suppose now that for any (m − k)-element subset T ⊆ S, there exists a player who
strictly prefers T to S\T . We color the vertices of G with n colors 1, 2, . . . , n in the
following way. For each vertex v of G corresponding to a set T , we color it with the
color corresponding to a player who strictly prefers T to S\T . If there is more than one
such player, choose one arbitrarily.
By Lemma 1, the chromatic number of G is m− 2(m− k) + 2 = 2k −m+ 2 ≥ n+ 1.
Since we colored G with n colors, there exist two adjacent vertices sharing the same
color, say, T1 and T2. This means that T1 ≻i S\T1 and T2 ≻i S\T2 for some player
i. Since T1 and T2 are disjoint, we have T1 ⊆ S\T2 and T2 ⊆ S\T1. Monotonicity of
preferences now implies that S\T1 i T2 ≻i S\T2 i T1, a contradiction to T1 ≻i S\T1.
This case is thus impossible, which implies that we can always find our desired subset
T .
Finally, we show that there exist monotonic preferences for which the bound min (k,m)
is tight. We consider two cases.
Case 1 : n ≥ m. Then min(k,m) = m. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, let the preference of player
i be such that she prefers item xi to the subset S\{xi} of the remaining items. Such a
monotonic preference exists, e.g., the preference in Example 2. Then any subset T ⊆ S
that is agreeable to player i must contain item i. Hence a subset T that is agreeable to
all players must contain all m items.
Case 2 : n < m. Then min(k,m) = k. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, let the preference of
player i be such that she prefers item xi to the subset S\{xi} of the remaining items.
Such a monotonic preference exists, e.g., the preference in Example 2. Let the preference
of player n depend solely on the presence of items n, n+ 1, . . . ,m. In particular, player
n prefers to have more of these items than less.
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, any subset T ⊆ S that is agreeable to player i must contain
item i. Also, any subset T that is agreeable to player n must contain at least half of the
items n, n + 1, . . . ,m. Hence a subset T that is agreeable to all players must have size
at least n− 1 +
⌈
m−n+1
2
⌉
= k, as desired.
We again ask the question of how to obtain a subset whose existence is guaranteed
by Theorem 2. The following theorem provides a polynomial-time algorithm in the
case of three players with responsive preferences. Since preferences on subsets, unlike
preferences on single items, might not have a succinct representation, we assume that the
algorithm is allowed to make a polynomial number of queries to a preference oracle. In
each query, the algorithm can specify a player and two subsets of items to the preference
oracle, and the oracle reveals the preference of that player between the two subsets.
The algorithm presented in the theorem is weaker than the one for two players in
Theorem 1 in that it relies not only on preferences on single items but also on preferences
on subsets.
Theorem 3. Assume that there are three players with responsive preferences 1, 2,
and 3 on S. There exists a subset T ⊆ S such that |T | ≤
⌈
m
2
⌉
+ 1 and T is agreeable
for all three players. Moreover, there exist responsive preferences for which the bound
⌈m
2
⌉+ 1 is tight. We also give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds such a subset T .
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Proof. The existence of a subset T ⊆ S such that |T | ≤ ⌈m
2
⌉+ 1 and T is agreeable for
all three players follows from Theorem 2. The tightness of the bound also follows, since
one can make the preferences used to show tightness in Theorem 2 responsive. Next, we
give an algorithm to find such a subset T .
Assume first that m = 2k is even. Suppose without loss of generality that x2k−1 is
the most preferred item according to 1, x2k is the most preferred item besides x2k−1
according to 2, and that among the remaining 2k − 2 items, the preference 1 ranks
them as x1 1 x2 1 · · · 1 x2k−2. One can check using Proposition 2 that the set
{x2k−1, x2, x4, x6, . . . , x2k−2, x2k} is agreeable to player 1.
Let A = {x1, x2, . . . , x2k−2}, and consider the pairs (x1, x2), (x3, x4), . . . , (x2k−3, x2k−2).
Let B be a set of k− 1 elements containing an item from each pair that is less preferred
by 2 than its pair. If 2 prefers the two items in some pair equally, we choose an
arbitrary item from that pair.
While A\B 2 B, we remove an element from B that is less preferred by 2 than its
pair, and insert its pair into B. Since the preference is responsive and there are finitely
many items, we eventually reach a point where B 2 A\B. We consider two cases.
Case 1 : We have not performed any insertion into or removal from B. By definition of
B, we have that A\B 2 B, and therefore A\B ∼2 B. Since preferences are monotonic,
it follows that A\B ∪ {x2k} 2 B and B ∪ {x2k} 2 A\B.
Case 2 : We have performed some insertion into or removal from B. Suppose that our
last insertion was on x2i−1 and our last removal was on x2i. Let C = A\(B ∪ {x2i}) ∪
{x2i−1} andD = B\{x2i−1}∪{x2i}. We have that C ≻2 D and B 2 A\B, and it follows
from the monotonicity of preferences that C ∪ {x2k} 2 D and B ∪ {x2k} 2 A\B. We
will show that at least one of D ∪ {x2k} 2 C and A\B ∪ {x2k} 2 B holds.
Suppose for contradiction that C ≻2 D ∪ {x2k} and B ≻2 A\B ∪ {x2k}. Then by the
responsiveness of preferences, we have C ≻2 D ∪ {x2k} 2 B ≻2 A\B ∪ {x2k} ≻2 C, a
contradiction. Hence at least one of D ∪ {x2k} 2 C and A\B ∪ {x2k} 2 B holds.
In both Cases 1 and 2, we can find a subset E ⊆ A of k−1 elements containing an item
from each of the pairs (x1, x2), (x3, x4), . . . , (x2k−3, x2k−2) such that E ∪ {x2k} 2 A\E
and A\E ∪ {x2k} 2 E. This set E will be crucial in the description of our algorithm.
We choose our set T of k + 1 items as follows.
1. We include x2k−1 and x2k in T .
2. We include in T either E or A\E according to which one player 3 prefers. (If
player 3 is indifferent between the two sets, we choose one of them arbitrarily.)
Next, we claim that our chosen set T is agreeable for all three players. We prove the
claim separately for each of the players.
• From the perspective of player 1, the worst set T we could have chosen is
{x2k−1, x2, x4, x6, . . . , x2k−2, x2k}.
Since this set is agreeable to player 1 and preferences are responsive, our set T is
agreeable to player 1.
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• Since E ∪ {x2k} 2 A\E and A\E ∪ {x2k} 2 E and we include the remaining
item x2k−1, T is also agreeable for player 2.
• Since we choose the set E or A\E that player 3 prefers and we include both of the
remaining items x2k−1 and x2k, T is also agreeable for player 3.
Hence T is agreeable for all three players, as desired. This concludes the case m even.
Assume now that m = 2k+1 is odd. Let S′ be the set of all items of S except x1. We
apply the algorithm from the case of m even to choose a set T ⊆ S′ of k + 1 items such
that T is agreeable for all three players, when the universe considered is S′. It follows
that T ∪ {x1} is a subset of k + 2 items that is agreeable for all three players, when the
universe considered is S.
Even though the algorithm in Theorem 3 also relies on preferences on subsets, the
number of subsets involved in the algorithm is only linear in the number of items, hence
the algorithm remains efficient even when the number of items is relatively large.
One may ask whether we may restrict the algorithm in Theorem 3 to rely only on
preferences on single items similarly to the case of two players. The following example
shows that the answer is negative. In particular, a necessarily agreeable subset of size
at most min
(⌈
m+n−1
2
⌉
,m
)
does not always exist.
Example 3. Suppose that there are six items x1, . . . , x6, and consider the following
preferences 1,2,3 of three players on the single items:
1: x1 ≻ x4 ≻ x5 ≻ x6 ≻ x2 ≻ x3,
2: x2 ≻ x5 ≻ x6 ≻ x4 ≻ x3 ≻ x1,
3: x3 ≻ x6 ≻ x4 ≻ x5 ≻ x1 ≻ x2.
If we had access to the preferences on subsets, the algorithm in Theorem 3 would
yield a subset of
⌈
6
2
⌉
+ 1 = 4 items that is agreeable to all three players. However, to
obtain a necessarily agreeable subset, we need to include all of x1, x2, x3 as they are
most preferred by at least one player. Moreover, choosing only one of x4, x5, x6 does not
yield a necessarily agreeable subset for the player who ranks that item fourth. Hence a
necessarily agreeable subset contains at least five items.
6 Future Work
Our work suggests a number of possible future directions. With the polynomial-time
algorithms for two and three players in mind, a natural question to ask is whether we can
similarly obtain efficient algorithms for more players. The algorithm for three players is
already quite involved, so one might suspect that the problem is intractable for larger
numbers of players. If that were to be the case, it would be useful to have a confirmation
by means of a hardness result, even for some fixed large number of players. Since the
problem is a search problem in which we know that a solution always exists, the problem
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would not be NP-hard, but could potentially be hard with respect to some subclass of
TFNP such as PPAD or PLS. One could also ask about the NP-hardness of deciding the
existence of an agreeable subset of some smaller size for which there is no guarantee of
existence.
Since the algorithm in Theorem 3 relies on preferences on subsets, we can consider a
different setting in which we are not given access to preferences on subsets but only to
preferences on single items. In this setting, we need to choose a subset that is necessarily
agreeable to all three players, and as Example 3 shows, this may well force us to choose
more items than we need to in the case where we have access to preferences on subsets.
We can ask how many items we need to choose in the worst case, and whether there
exists an efficient algorithm to compute those items. Of course, the same question can
be asked for the corresponding setting with more players as well.
An interesting related question that goes beyond our setting is the following: When
is it possible to obtain an envy-free allocation between two (or more) parties if there
are multiple players in each party, possibly with wildly differing preferences? To the
best of our knowledge, the fair-division literature has so far only focused on settings in
which each party consists of a single player. Whether we can come up with an algorithm
along the lines of the undercut procedure [12] to find an envy-free allocation in the
multiple-player setting when one exists is an appealing direction that we leave for future
research.
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